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## Amity and Enmity in Regional Integration; the East African Community (EAC) Experience

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### Abstract

East African Community from a traditional three states to the current six states has undergone different experiences in her cooperation and integration process from the pre-independence, the independence era, and post-independence era which suits the definition of the contemporary era. The context of the contemporary global political economy revolves around a post-tripartite trading block among neighboring states, shaped by empirical theory (what is the question) as opposed to the normative theory of “what ought to be”. Such realities are relationships based in forms of amity and enmity in the process of competition between citizens/states over policy preferences and interests. The resultant effects lead to; first, shifts in patterns of cooperation and integration, and secondly, the existence of durability and endurability in cooperation and integration. After examination and assessment of the effects respectively in relation to the East African experience, this article/presentation proposes a need to transcend the above enmity for amity in East African Community Cooperation and Integration process. Underscoring the existence of amity and enmity in state cooperation and integration in a region such as EAC defines a Regional Security Complex due to socio-eco-political beneficial security interdependences and existing vs potential conflicts. The need for a unified developmental-centric approach through cooperation and integration by EAC from the foregoing prompts the need for the application of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Buzan and Waver.

**Keywords:** Amity; Enmity; Regional integration; Regional cooperation; EAC; RSC; RSCT; Conflict.

### 1. Introduction

In its entirety, the paper takes cognizance to the overriding theme. This article “*Amity and Enmity in Regional Integration; the East African Community (EAC) Experience*” is organized around; introduction, study methodology adopted, results and discussions through the context of contemporary global political economy and East African Region (EAR) Security Complex(es). Though postulated that amity gives more latitude to driving regional cooperation and integration, it is here submitted that underlying amity and enmity is a reflection of a normalcy in regions. It is the desire of this paper that finally the drivers of cooperation and integration may be understood through the attempted discourse explication.

The study on East African Community (EAC) drivers of cooperation and integration is a discourse that continues to attract varied scholarly perspectives. Some of these intra-African regionalism themes encircle; *first* the traditional East African states of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania with construed thinking that early independent history and ideologues had an issue with the cooperation and integration. *The second* thinking situates regionalism to be outcome geared towards harnessing cultural interactions of disjointed ethnicities due to balkanization by colonial powers. *Third* to these is the context of need to fit into the contemporary Global Political Economy (GPE) which makes actions of many post-independent states cooperating suit the contemporary tag. These positions are interlinked in as far as they seem to stand alone as generalizations to wider drivers and can exist as *factor based drivers and reason/objective drivers*. In them specific important functional, institutional, and structural challenges can accrue. However, the EAC region and others in Africa need beyond the challenges trajectory in its future strides.

In an article; “*The changing Faces of East African Region Economic Cooperation: Is it Politics or Economic Expediency?*”, the author adds to this debate in an attempt to clarify some of the introductory assertions thus; East African regional cooperation has been a historic monumental concept both to the then colonizers and later to the citizens in this geographic area. Scholars need to distinguish integration into its major concepts and themes than just a mere mention as currently understood. We see many forms of integration as being in place. *One*, integration by colonialism; *secondly*, integration by ideology (over – riding common ideology); *thirdly*, geo – political integration; *fourth*, integration by trend influence; *fifth*, there is cultural integration; and *sixth*, there is economic integration. For economists, integration can further be viewed in form of integration by production and supply chains including

enhancing factors to the same. Nonetheless, in taking cognizance of the fact that despite their uniqueness, they crosscut; some may be components of the other (Juma, 2018). The argument here specifically opens the views on integration which summarily is socio-economic-political. These three form necessitant generalizations of why cooperation and integration.

Distinctly, in their submissions on *why regions, regionalism and regional phenomenon* (Novell and Pereira, 2019) agree the concepts as a whole have been part of the International Relations because of considering regions popularity as a result of cultural interactions through systemic factors that make possible cooperation. Arguing in his writing “*New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace ...*” Hettne posits, whereas the old regionalism was formed in bipolar Cold War Context, the new is taking shape in a multipolar world order. Whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and “from above”, the new is a more spontaneous process from within and “from below”. Whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process (Hettne, 1994). The argument creates a two generational sphere of viewing at regionalism and the operationalization dimensions. Quick to note in this discourse is that the reference of the new which is considered here as the contemporary regionalism adopts a modus operandi of inward looking and engagement of pyramidal approach in its community of states approach.

As if different from Hettne yet complementing the thought advanced, Neumann (1994) focuses exclusively on the levels of analysis theory approach to cooperation and integration, i.e., a categorization that is based on considerations that are systemic (“outside-in”) or internal to the region (“inside-out”). Tassinari (2004), for example, points out that, if only the one-dimensional model proposed by Neumann is considered, the categorization of studies associated with the neorealist and globalist theories of International Relations would be grouped together at the end of the “outside-in” continuum since, despite the numerous differences and tension points between the two approaches, both see regions as a result of systemic dynamics.

To this extent, premised on clear understanding of East African Community in *geo-specific* and *histo-specific* can enable better analysis of drivers of cooperation and integration. East African regional cooperation (EAC) is understood (Juma, 2018) to be an existence of states in the Eastern part of Africa with similar history and cultures which have despite of challenges coexisted. Vibrantly existing together as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda at independence and later on with progression of activities, it expanded to five countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) by the year 2007 when the Francophone countries were admitted. Yet still because of its somehow attractiveness and buoyant economic nature, the interests of South Sudan to join it yielded on March 2nd 2016. Additionally, the changing faces/phases is both discussable in terms of its operational basis comprising the states forming it at any time while at the same time this paper looks at the changing faces informed by the drivers of the regional outfit at any time. In my second view anchored on the drivers of the regional outfit, this paper focuses on the leadership changes as playing a complex role in EAC’s advancement.

With the notion of cooperation, regional integration involves the coming together of two or more states, usually through reciprocal preferential arrangements. It happens in five progressive stages namely; a free trade area, customs union, common market, and monetary union and finally a political integration. The European Union (EU) transcended these stages since its inception in 1957 and is now the only regional organization with the institutional capacity responsible for governance, trade, monetary policies and social welfare. On its part, the African Union (AU) is a continental regional organization comprising eight sub regional blocs that were created mainly for economic purposes (Anjalo *et al.*, 2018).

The regional cooperation schemes initiated in the 1950s and 1960s reflect three major trends. First, a move from bilateral - sector cooperation to economy-wide agreements. Second, institutional links became tighter under the framework of the European Common Market. Finally, in Europe the EC and EFTA dived to a single European Economic Area. This core region has become an attractive market for non-members in Eastern Europe (Preusse, 1994).

From the EC, the 1960s wave of regionalism reached Africa through founding of the Central African Customs Union in 1964, Latin America via the Central American Common Market in 1960 and the Andean Pact in 1969. In Asia, ASEAN was launched in 1967 (Kommerskolleguim, 1991). During the 1970s regional schemes languished, though there were some exceptions including the creation of the Community of West African States in 1975. In the 1980s regionalism speeded up again. The United States was a major player. It proposed the Americas Initiative and initiated FTAs with Israel (1989) and Canada (1985). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern African Development Consultative Conference (SADCC- today SADC) was formed in 1980. Australia and New Zealand also signed an agreement: the Australia, New Zealand Closer Economic Relation Trade Agreement (ANZERTA) in 1983 (Kommerskolleguim, 1991).

Regionalization in the 90s reveals three new trends. First, the number of regional agreements has risen as has the number of countries that belong to a regional grouping. Second, in the case of the European Community, integration has advanced to the stage of implementing a European Union with free movement of factors of production, institutional harmonization and joint formulation of industrial, trade and competition policies. Thirdly, regionalism is beginning to produce its own dynamics. Non-members are afraid of being excluded from the integrated markets. That is why several Latin American countries have sought to obtain bilateral agreements with the United States. The same is true for Eastern Europe with regard to the EU (Preusse, 1994). Discussions of regionalism today often make a distinction between old and new forms of regionalism (Hettne, 1994).

Summarily, East African regional integration progress political wise (to include social and economic) by and large is permeated with amity and enmity through; her history and ideologues, cultural interactions of disjointed ethnicities, her fitting into the contemporary Global Political Economy, and the many forms of integration.

Interesting portion to these is the nature of contemporary global political economy; systemic factors and confusing designs (from outside and “from above”/ from within and “from below”). Lack of awareness of which design different rational actors are employing and a Neorealist and Globalist International order where actors support cooperation and integration their states would grudgingly be part of within their environment in exercise of realism. A concerted effort by member states, the greater potential beneficiaries (citizens), and external actors against the odds arising from amity and enmity would catalyze the existing cooperation and integration.

## 2. Study Methodology

The method used in this article is qualitative deriving from secondary sources. It took the nature of a descriptive research which involved study of numerous scholarly materials relevant to some of the themes and sub-themes in the article. These were carefully thought and adopted. The paper was organized in a manner convenient to allow progression of key concepts and variables to address the workshop theme. Affirming no invention of a wheel, this study would consider itself to have been fundamentally guided by call it a *descriptive – explication* design (process of analyzing and developing an idea through description) in its intent to display the drivers of cooperation and integration conceptually (amity and enmity relations) and theoretically (finding RSCT application centric to EAC).

## 3. Results and Discussions

### 3.1. Context of Contemporary Global Political Economy

Theoretically speaking, context of contemporary global political economy opens existential questions on states interactions which attracts the “*what is*” and “*what ought to be*” situations. This two give rise to empirical theory and normative theory respectively. Critically analyzed they form relationships of amity and enmity which predispose states to more cooperation and integration or less. Empirical theory is concerned with realities in shaping inter-state relations thus sympathetic to Neoliberal regimes as solutions to state challenges systemically. In opposition to what is question is the normative theory whose concern is ideal (*what ought to be*) hence projects realism above all. The application of the two theories in inter-state relations within a region display in one way or the other amity or enmity in regional integration.

Discussing this context of contemporary global political economy is to project a world of states alongside economic activities. This simplistically is to picture how states economically interact with other states and international actors and still remain states and further to evaluate how the involvement improves the quality of statehood. This concept in a regional context to a great degree is what has set in motion the present regional cooperation and integration.

As [Leiteritz \(2005\)](#) observes, the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE) is one of the most recent entries into the curricular canon of International Relations (IR). While the term ‘political economy’ has of course a formidable intellectual pedigree, IPE scholars came to associate themselves with this new label only during the 1970s, when a group of political scientists defined IPE as an autonomous field of research apart from economics. The volume by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye “Power and Interdependence” (1977/2001) emblematically signaled the arrival of the new sub-discipline within International Relations. Scholars increasingly realized the multiple interactions between politics and economics on the international level.

The U.S. scholar Robert Gilpin provided the - still widely used - standard definition of IPE along the cleavage between the state and the market: *The parallel existence and mutual interaction of ‘state’ and ‘market’ in the modern world create ‘political economy’*(...). In the absence of the state, the price mechanism and market forces would determine the outcome of economic activities; this would be the pure world of the economist. In the absence of the market, the state or its equivalent would allocate economic resources; this would be the pure world of the political scientist ([Gilpin, 1987](#)).

Gilpin puts the state and the market at loggerheads over economic activities and resources. In overall, the states emerge supremely given they possess governments and to some sort a progenitor of population, territory, and resources hence can determine structural arrangements and institutions of operationalization with her control or uncontrolled. It is under this authoritative role of the state that bilateral and multilateral relations spring up in a bid survive the state. In the contemporary era, the functional global political economy exceedingly takes the form of active or passive post-tripartite trading blocks (engagements beyond basic multilateralism). The active ones taking advantage of geographic proximity have engrained themselves in the form of regional cooperation and integration, mostly attracting smaller/weaker economies with vast underutilized resources to transform their development path.

Both spheres ‘state and market’ in [Leiteritz words \(2005\)](#) are supposed to operate separately, with different functional logics. While power politics dominates the political realm, market processes are driven by economic or efficiency imperatives. However, the increasingly complex links between developed countries described by Keohane and Nye and more recently the onslaught of globalization in all its different forms, including the rise of new actors such as multinational corporations and social movements across borders in my view exhibit forms of amity and enmity.

In the words of [Hurrell \(2005\)](#) the new regionalism needs to be understood as a multidimensional and multilevel process which is not based solely on or around states, but reflects the activities of states, firms and social groups and networks. Regionalism needs to be viewed as taking place within a range of arenas, involving a heterogeneous set of actors, acting both “from above” and “from below” and tying together material factors and ideas and identities.

As [Tassinari \(2004\)](#) points out, regional integration, tend to produce effects involving sectors and actors originally not contemplated by the regional integration project. Therefore, despite maintaining the state-centric logic,

Haas neofunctionalism, as well as liberal institutionalism, departs from systemic explanations in favour of empirically guided experience of each regional group. Nevertheless (Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann, 2006), their focus is on the mobility of people, capital, values, and ideas and how this process continually shapes the global arena. Globalists see globalization to involve economic integration; the transfer of policies across borders; the transmission of knowledge; cultural stability; the reproduction, relations, and discourses of power; it is a global process, a concept, a revolution and an establishment of the global market free from socio-political control.

### 3.2. East African Region: Security Complex (es)

A regional security complex is best explained by Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) which provides a theoretical justification for constructing world regions based on the degree of enmity and amity existing among states (Stivachtis, 2018). This is to say that the enduring inter-state relationships with possibilities of threats qualify the threshold of a security complex.

The regional security complex (RSC) model rests on the interdependence among the key national security interests of a geographically compact group of states. Barry Buzan identifies RSC as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely, so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another." The intrinsic interdependence of the security of states under the RSC model is generated in several dimensions, such as common and conflicting interests, interdependent behaviors, and interconnected perceptions. And, of course, all of this has a regional geographic foundation. "They (the security complexes) represent the way in which the sphere of concern that any state has about its environment, interacts with the linkage between the intensity of military and political threats, and the shortness of the range over which they are perceived. Because threats operate more potently over short distances, security interactions with neighbors will tend to have first priority" (Buzan, 1991).

The relations within RSC (McSweeney, 1999) are determined not only by the geographic proximity of the states involved, but also by the anarchic nature of the international political system. In other words, RSC is a geographically limited and materially and perceptually specific example of international anarchy with the corresponding internal amity/enmity relationships.

Regional security complex is a vital button to press in the desire to think and thrive a more cohesive regional cooperation. With many promising regional blocks of states, demarcating security complexes is finding solutions. In African geopolitics, the Horn of Africa (Mabera, 2020) is a complex site of geopolitical and geostrategic importance, inextricably linked to key aspects of its history and geography. The uptick in engagement by external actors, and their attendant interests, alliances and agendas, underscore the pivotal role of geopolitics in shaping the security and economic trajectory of the region. The complex web of external actors and interests, the potentiality of increased geopolitical competition, regionalization of conflicts and shifting domestic politics intersect at various points in the interregional order with implications for the role and mandate of the regional mechanism.

The Horn of Africa can be conceived as a regional security complex, defined as 'a set of states whose major security preoccupations and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another' (Buzan, 1991). This is reiterated by Lake and Morgan who describe a regional security complex as 'a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area.' The historical patterns of amity and enmity among the countries of the region, coupled with multifaceted layers of security interdependence has constantly animated the foreign policies of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, particularly with regard to state formation, regime security and visions of regional order (Lake and Morgan, 1997).

On their part, Anjalo, Okoth, and Kimokoti delving on this issue avers that, the security complex that is the EAC has a bearing on its primary goal of becoming a political federation albeit the security dynamics. Because security cannot easily be separated from its regional neighbours, securitized issues within the Community heighten tensions between its partners fanning the amity - enmity relationship. Examples of the complex relationships are the controversial EAC - EU EPA, the Coalition of the Willing (COW) in development issues, tensions between Rwanda and Burundi over the recent political crisis in Burundi. Thus the regional security complex of the EAC has a direct influence on its current and future integration aspirations (2018).

Similarities to the East African Community progress without a doubt benefits from the outcome of Buzan's characteristics of RSCT of state interdependence, geographic linkage, sharing security concerns, and spillages of threats over short distances (majorly political, social, and economic). An area which has not been much felt is the intensity of military threats except sporadic earlier incidences. As a construct, many reasons as highlighted of security complex also suit East African Region (EAR) and synonymizing it to EAC. It creates avenue for thinking some possible EAR security complexes which this paper postulate into five (5) to include; *The Lake Victoria Complex*, *The Interstate Infrastructural Complex*, *The Mara Complex*, *The Landlocked States Complex*, and *The Oceanic Complex*. The thinking is a derivative of inter-state security altercations – potential and past threat hence attracting the generalization. Further to this, Stivachtis assertion of constructing world regions on the basis of amity and enmity.

Of course security and insecurity varies from one region to another in terms of hardware and software but the underlying effects remain the same – effects on man, environment, and economy. With this in mind East African Regional Security Complex (EARSC) with her unique circumstances. Grabowski Wojciech while analyzing security in the Persian Gulf (Grabowski, 2020) through the prism of the theory of regional security complex, the Middle East becomes a conflict formation that refers to the model of security interdependence between the countries of the region, which is shaped by; the fear of war and expectancy of violence and distrust and ubiquitous threat in the

relations of the Gulf States which in response leads these countries to form alliances prompting security dilemma. Unlike the Persian Gulf, the security complexes in EAC rotate around; sour trade due to insincerity of state actors, ignorance of primary sovereign actors (citizens), ingenuine border disputes, and electoral/governance issues. These build into insurmountable threat to regional cooperation and integration.

Lack of attention to security complexes may cause a mark-time march syndrome in regionalism erstwhile referred to as “*regionalization without regionalism*”. Associated with this argument, Börzel and Risse (2016), suggest that few other world regions display the same degree of regionalisation as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and yet few, if any, have so little regionalism. While regionalisation is a spontaneous, bottom-up, endogenous process involving a variety of non-state actors organised in formal and informal networks, centred around strong cultural, political and social dimensions, regionalism is a state-led process of integration, whereby formal regional institutions and organisations, mostly in the economic and security realms, are established and sustained.

### 3.3. Amity and Enmity in East African Region

First and foremost, the question of amity and enmity as inherent solution-problem as they are to regionalism calls for asking why cooperate and integrate. The answer to this is solution seeking found in interdependency. It in no way aspires to alter the basic characteristics of statehood in realists perspective but to make it beneficial through neoliberalism, and by so doing suspicion, fear, genuine friendship, and support themselves should be drivers to cooperation and integration at the level of single state regionally than in the bigger global system. I would express pessimism at the onset that amity and enmity just like Regional Security Complex Theory of Barry Buzan assumes an existence of interdependent environment thus contrary to this would render it inapplicable. Supportively from regional history and Pan Africanism drive of the 1960s one gets a justification to the assumption that cooperation and integration gears towards deep interdependency thus exuding scholarly optimism.

In this connection, amity and enmity expand in scope and become more complex as cooperation among states widens. This is to mean, the intensity of these relationships at bilateral level especially for enmity is less toxic as would be where three and more states cooperate. Durability and undurability of amity on the other is best tested in an expanded inter-state relationship. The argument supporting this assertion about the drivers of cooperation and integration from which amity and enmity arise are almost obvious; *human drivers, actorial (actor based) drivers, ecological drivers, institutional based drivers, historical drivers, and economic necessitants drivers*. Human and Actorial drivers are political and cultural by nature, ecological drivers are geographic and circumstantial by nature, and economic necessitants cuts across many other drivers. It is observed that drivers to regional cooperation and integration broadly would be factor based drivers (stated in italics) and reason/objective based drivers (regional market efficiency, cost sharing, mutuality in policy cooperation, and achieving peace and security).

Map-1. EAC Single Customs Territory Model



Source: [www.eiseverywhere.com](http://www.eiseverywhere.com)

This map illustrates EAC single customs territory model with major border posts, interlinking infrastructure, and the two currently major Oceanic ports into the region. The Lamu Port in Kenya's coast is an additional regional

interface facility. *Border points, major roads, the railway, oil pipelines, and waterways* provide major drivers for EAC cooperation and integration amidst amity and enmity. The major existing borders among the six countries comprise;

1. **Tanzania** – Namanga, Isebania, Lungalunga, Loitokitok, and Taveta (with Kenya),
  - Mutukula and Kikagati (with Uganda),
  - Kabanga/Kobero and Mugina (with **Burundi**), and
  - Benaco/Rusumo (with **Rwanda**)
2. **Kenya** - Busia, Malaba, Lokitanyala, Lwakhakha, and Suam (with Uganda), and Kapoeta with **South Sudan** from 17<sup>th</sup> June 2019 within the disputed Illemi triangle.
3. **Uganda** - Elegu/Nimule with **South Sudan**. Perennial disputes exist over Pajok and Kajo Keji.
4. Katuna/Gatuna and Chanika with **Rwanda**. High volatility caused the former to an almost a two year closure.

NB/- Apart from these, Lake Victoria with intention of Blue economy poses another border points at Kisumu, Mwanza and Bukoba, and Kampala for the three traditional EAC states.

Regional cooperation and integration among states in East Africa are based on long standing relationships fitting amity and enmity descriptions. This is exacerbated by underlying state interests in realpolitik which tend to influence regional policy preferences among competing partner states. [Stivachtis \(2018\)](#), assertively defines amity as inter-state relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectation of protection or support whereas enmity is on the other hand, an inter-state relationships conditioned by suspicion and fear. From Stivachtis, two extremes emerge in inter-state relations; protection and support on one end with suspicion and fear in another extreme.

The extremities are features of states globally. Ogurlu sheds light into the inherency of amity and enmity relations by use of purpose of diplomacy. Thus he posits, diplomacy is traditionally an instrument used by states to develop and sustain peaceful and predictable relations among themselves. From the historical evolution of diplomacy, it is argued that diplomacy has transformed in order to adapt itself to the newly emerging conditions of the 21st century. It has become a multi-actor and multi-level network phenomenon. However, this diplomatic transformation has not diluted the traditional sovereignty-based diplomacy. As states maintain their ultimate power and authority in the globalized system, so does state diplomacy. Diplomacy depends on the prior existence of human societies with basic needs for security as well as communication ([Ogurlu, 2019](#)). By stating what diplomacy does is a testament that characteristically Westphalian entities first exhibit amity and enmity and secondly, that regional cooperation and integration in principle in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is Neoliberal by nature thus driven by multiple agents alongside traditional principals. Further to this, the need for security implies existence of threats and fears intertwining the actor relationships.

Explicating relations among states in a region such as EAC to a great extent fits into [Buzan \(1991\)](#) prism of balance of power (BOP) theory. He supposes, a more traditional way to define a region is with reference to BOP theory with principal element of patterns of amity and enmity. These patterns being products of BOP are flexible making states shift their alignments in accordance with the dictates of movements in the distribution of power. In this process, the historical dynamic of amity and enmity is only partly related to the balance of power, and where it is related, it is much more durable. Moreover, patterns of amity and enmity arise from a variety of issues ranging from border disputes, ideological alignments, and longstanding historical links.

Empiricism about regional cooperation and integration in EAC is a hallmark of shifts in relational patterns which would see the traditional member states and even with the current composition thus depicting change of alignments. The most visible lines of enmity have been; the 1970s stalemates among the traditional member states, recurrent Kenya – Uganda stalemate over Mombasa feeder port, Kenya-Uganda over cross border Pokot-Karamoja cattle feuds, Kenya-Uganda Migingo control, Tanzania-Kenya Serengeti environmental issue, Tanzania-Kenya Mara wildebeest migration, Rwanda-Uganda border truck feuds, Uganda-Tanzania immigration standoffs, Rwanda-Burundi, South Sudan-Uganda standoffs, among many others have played against fast track of cooperation and integration. On the other hand in periods of amity, the region has experienced robust milestones. There is an observable constant to these relationships which also acts as a real positive and negative drive – the state drivers at different points in time. They determine durability and undurability of amity and enmity.

In international relations the behaviour of leaders is a vital element among many in determining the state behaviour. Shaping of foreign policy involve the context and the elite. [Spies \(2008\)](#) assert that it is important to understanding foreign policy at specific domestic and external context and the interactions between these two environments. As major players in foreign policy, elite operate between institutions that continually constrain them. More specifically ([McGowan et al., 2004](#)) the class that controls and wields state power necessarily shapes foreign policy and does so, as might be supposed, in accordance with its own class interests even though these might be rationalized ideologically as the interests of the entire nation. Spies and McGowan et'al agree that amity and enmity is human actor dependent in form of elites and class in charge of the state hence the drivers amidst the veil of context.

Given what states are in global structure, relationships are driven by foreign policies, a document whose flexibility unlike constitutions is hostage to the ruling political class. In its formulation, [Ahmed \(2016\)](#) opines that the process of foreign policy formulation derives from five factors: natural material basic - including size of territory, population, geographic location, resources and the state and level of economic technological development; societal structure and forces, including social classes, ethnic composition and cultural and psychological factors at work in

the society. In other words, the drivers of making foreign policies in essence command international relations of a state at whatever level.

Writing on “*State’s Foreign Policy: Determinants and Constraints*”, [Wanjohi \(2011\)](#) asserts, in general terms there are three determinants of foreign policies in any given state. These include its power, objectives, and leadership. These have both domestic and international influence. Above all the attributes, the driving force is what Wanjohi refers to as leadership.

It should be understood that different typologies of amity and enmity arise in regional cooperation and integration; those necessitated by interactive acts of being neighbouring states (local state actors) and those resulting from external-internal states interactions. The other draws from what Keohane and Nye call Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and social movements due to their interests in specific states or in regions. These lead to patterns of conflict formations, trade relations, security relations, and social exchanges. Indeed many factors characterize existence of amity and enmity; socio-cultural and political life of people in a sub-region, geographic proximity, and unique contextual threats of regional entities all of which are hidden in actors.

## 4. Conclusion

In its conclusion, summarily, transcending above enmity for amity for EAC Cooperation and Integration is important. In as much as amity may seem desirable to enmity for obvious reasons of supportiveness and genuine friendship which diplomats describe in one word ‘*cordial*’ relations, suspicion and fear play a great role in states determination to survive in international relations. That aside, strong alliances (cooperation and at higher levels integration) depend much on amity. This is so because “the environment first principle” (marked with stability and durability) would precede other drivers such as the political actors, economic advantages like resources and markets, and other actors in that order.

A conscious ascendancy from enmity to amity requires benefiting from theoretical paradigms. A move from realism then would mean Neoliberal regime where functionalism and institutionalism takes centre stage and genuinely supported by cooperating local state actors and any external financiers. Haas, Groom and Taylor in [Juma \(2018\)](#) categorically assert, the assumptions of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism generate a “Functional Theory” regarding international regimes – Rational actors devise institutions to satisfy information needs but this implies complete endogeneity. Institutions are shaped by the requirements of the structure of the international system. According to functionalism, international cooperation is the collective governance and ‘material interdependence’ between states which develop own internal dynamic as they integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas. The states give international agencies ability to meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand the area of integration. The objective of functionalism towards global peace is achieved through functional cooperation by the work of international organizations.


In the mid-1990s the journal *International Security* hosted a famous debate on the impact of international institutions on peace and stability. The debate, which frames the current article on regional organisations, commenced with the neo-realist assertion by John Mearsheimer that institutions can do little if anything to enhance stability in an anarchical international system that generates fear, uncertainty and relentless competition for power and security among states ([Nathan, 2010](#)). ([Mearsheimer, 1994/95](#)) defined *an institution* as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should co-operate and compete with each other, prescribing acceptable forms of state behaviour and proscribing unacceptable kinds of behaviour.

Transcending from enmity to amity is a resolute consideration of institutions however little they may contribute to stability where anarchy reigns. Even though Mearsheimer contradicts through disparaging institutions ability to enhance stability and by focusing instead on the self-interested calculations of the great powers making institutions to have no independent effect on state behaviour hence not important cause of peace. Nonetheless he doesn’t endeavor to explicate whether lack of institutions nor realism would be a better option. This void acts in favour of institutions all together.

Pitting other scholars perspectives, [Keohane and Martin \(1995\)](#) responded by arguing that liberal institutionalism shares the utilitarian and rationalist underpinnings of realism, but posit that states set up institutions in order to advance their interests and facilitate collectively beneficial cooperation. In relation to security, institutions can provide states with information, reducing the uncertainty and risks associated with anarchy. [Wendt \(1995\)](#) challenged neo-realist thinking from a constructivist perspective, which holds that world politics is socially constructed. The fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and shape the identities and interests of states as well as their behaviour. These social structures are defined by shared knowledge and understanding among groups of states, and vary between relationships of mistrust and conflict and relationships of trust and co-operation. Interdependence, collective identity formation and the institutions of sovereignty and the democratic peace have greatly reduced the dangers of anarchy.

Cohesive regional entities describe a thin contradiction wherein lies collectivism and post-collectivism over time. In as much as interest drives states to this pendulumic motion of action for survival, collectivism with attributes such as; *shared goals, structuralism, interdependency, and agreeable norms* seem to drive regional existential of states to amity to enhance cooperation through supported durable stability (alliance building). This is very positive, however, caution should be given here that it is much applicable to weaker realist entities in global politics.



**Diagram-1.** Conceptual Illustration of Amity and Enmity in Regional Cooperation and Integration

Source: Author, 2021

In the conceptual framework above factor based drivers and reason/objective based drivers in cooperation and integration are inherent. Their presence leads to patterns of amity and enmity. This is illustrated by the arrows; **red** for enmity and **green** for amity. The diagram shows this existence within a region occurring between states (*State A to B, B to C, A to D, and B to D*), between states and IGOs, and among the IGOs. External to the region also exist Actorial drivers and changes in International Relations (IR) ecology which is itself a driver. With more states attracted together in a cooperation and integration, regional security complex exacerbate and this neoliberalism ushers in durability since enmity is relegated by unified developmental-centric approach and institutionalism in place. This scenario hence demonstrates the shaping by empirical theory (*what is*) and not normative (*what ought to be*). The latter defines the *realist environment* while the former is *neoliberal state of affairs*.

In agreement to the key idea discussed in the conceptual framework herein, [United \(2006\)](#) was in concurrence thus, regional integration in Africa follows the traditional concept based on geographical proximity and contiguity of countries and political cooperation through economic cooperation. But major internal and external forces are significantly changing economic relations within Africa and with the rest of the world. Important aspects of these changes are the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the new trade geography where rich countries seek greater integration with poor countries through bilateral trade agreements, and new institutions of international trade (such as the World Trade Organization). The European Union's economic partnership agreements are also likely to considerably change the architecture of regional integration in Africa.

Implications for future integration ([Odhiambo, 2011](#)) include; socio-economic and political implications on one hand and institutional implications (EADB, LVEMP, EACJ, Aviation, e.t.c.) on the other. Their existence, stability, and durability are drivers to integration. Finally, summarily, it is important to understand lines of security and insecurity as vital drivers of cooperation in themselves and again to drivers of cooperation and integration in any region. In this manner, suppressing enmity while elevating amity would gear progression to greater economic heights for sustainable human development.

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